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Contents

SIPRI Yearbook 2018

SIPRI Yearbook 2018

II. International tensions and shifting dynamics of power

Chapter:
1. Introduction: International stability and human security in 2017
Source:
SIPRI Yearbook 2018
Author(s):
Dan Smith

The background to the stalling of nuclear arms control since New START was agreed in 2010 includes the ailing relationship between Russia and the USA. The problem developed slowly. Long before Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Obama administration had wanted to reset relations with Russia, which had soured after the fighting between Georgia and Russia in August 2008.38 Even before then, difficulties had been looming for Russian–US arms control. This was partly because Russia was seeking a way back to a position of global strength and saw many of the arms control agreements, by which it was then bound, as products of earlier Russian weakness. There were also problems within the field of armaments and arms control itself. Following the USA’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia argued that US development of missile defence systems was a major obstacle to nuclear arms reductions because, if those systems become effective, it would destabilize the deterrence relationship. Russia has raised those concerns particularly since 2007, especially in relation to the INF Treaty, after the announcement of US plans to set up ballistic missile defences in Eastern Europe.39 Although the discussion in the USA and other NATO members focused on defence against Iranian missile potential, Russian officials repeatedly stated that the development would diminish Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture. In 2008 Russia reportedly began testing ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with a range prohibited by the INF Treaty.40 In February 2017 the US media reported that Russia had deployed these GLCMs; a senior US officer repeated this claim in a hearing at the US Congress.41 It is not possible to prove that, in the absence of a US missile defence capability, Russia would not have developed and tested the new GLCM; however, Russian statements of concern and a need to respond have been persistent and clear.

Citation (MLA):
Smith, Dan. "1. Introduction: International stability and human security in 2017." SIPRI Yearbook. SIPRI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. Web. 18 Dec. 2018. <http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198821557/sipri-9780198821557-chapter-1-div1-005.xml>.
Citation (APA):
Smith, D. (2016). 1. Introduction: International stability and human security in 2017. In SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 18 Dec. 2018, from http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198821557/sipri-9780198821557-chapter-1-div1-005.xml
Citation (Chicago):
Smith, Dan. "1. Introduction: International stability and human security in 2017." In SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Retrieved 18 Dec. 2018, from http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198821557/sipri-9780198821557-chapter-1-div1-005.xml
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