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Contents

SIPRI Yearbook 2010

SIPRI Yearbook 2010

II. European arms control

Chapter:
11. Conventional arms control
Source:
SIPRI Yearbook 2010
Author(s):
Zdzislaw Lachowski

The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is the most elaborate conventional arms control regime worldwide. Its implementation

Table 11.1. Aggregate treaty-limited equipment holdings of the states parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as of 1 January 2010

Year

Tanks

ACVs

Artillery

Aircraft

Helicopters

Total

1990

58 282

77 402

47 573

14 311

3 437

201 005

1992

55 939

78 273

46 344

13 525

3 215

197 296

1995

33 217

51 349

33 324

10 174

2 749

130 813

2000

30 338

46 968

31 511

9 070

2 497

120 384

2010

20 979

38 599

24 677

6 110

1 750

92 115

Aggregate limits for all states parties

40 000

60 000

40 000

13 600

4 000

157 600

Decrease, 1990–2010

−37 303

−38 803

−22 896

−8 201

−1 687

−108 890

ACVs = armoured combat vehicle

Source: Treaty on Conventional Arms Control in Europe and the Concluding Act on the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Consolidated Matrix, JCG document JCG.TOI/1/10, 19 Mar. 2010.

has resulted in more than a 50 per cent decrease in the aggregate holdings of the treaty-limited equipment (TLE)—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery of at least 100-mm calibre, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—of the parties (see table 11.1). However, it is built on an outdated bipolar concept: an equilibrium of major categories of heavy conventional armaments and equipment between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the now defunct Warsaw Treaty Organization in its Atlantic-to-the-Urals area of application. The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty would better respond to geopolitical shifts and new security circumstances and requirements.4 The agreement has not entered into force because the NATO members and other states parties refuse to ratify it until Russia complies with the commitments it made at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit.5 The 1990 CFE Treaty and the associated agreed documents and decisions therefore remain binding on all parties, although Russia has ‘suspended’ its implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Citation (MLA):
Lachowski, Zdzislaw. "11. Conventional arms control." SIPRI Yearbook. SIPRI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. Web. 18 Dec. 2018. <http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780199581122/sipri-9780199581122-div1-100.xml>.
Citation (APA):
Lachowski, Z. (2016). 11. Conventional arms control. In SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 18 Dec. 2018, from http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780199581122/sipri-9780199581122-div1-100.xml
Citation (Chicago):
Lachowski, Zdzislaw. "11. Conventional arms control." In SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Retrieved 18 Dec. 2018, from http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780199581122/sipri-9780199581122-div1-100.xml
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