Contents

SIPRI Yearbook 2014

SIPRI Yearbook 2014
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations and conventions
SIPRI Yearbook online
- How to access the SIPRI Yearbook online
- Contact information
Introduction
Introduction. International security, armaments and disarmament
- I. Global and regional security
- II. Dynamics of peace and conflict
- III. The relationship between science and security
- IV. Conclusions
1. Aspects of the conflict in Syria
- Overview
- I. Measuring conflict incidence in Syria
- II. Restricting arms supplies to Syria
- III. Arms control implications of the use of chemical weapons in Syria
Part I. Security and conflicts, 2013
2. Armed conflict
- Overview
- I. Mediation and peace agreements
- II. The United Nations Security Council in state-based armed conflicts, 2003–12
- III. Patterns of organized violence, 2003–12
- IV. The Global Peace Index 2013
3. Peace operations and conflict management
- Overview
- I. Global and regional trends in peace operations
- II. Peace operations in Africa
- III. Table of multilateral peace operations, 2013
Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2013
4. Military expenditure and arms production
- Overview
- I. Global developments in military expenditure
- II. US military expenditure
- III. Military spending and regional security in the Asia–Pacific
- IV. The reporting of military expenditure data to the United Nations
- V. The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies, 2012
- VI. Military expenditure data, 2004–13
5. International arms transfers
- Overview
- I. Developments in arms transfers, 2013
- II. Transfers of long-range guided missiles
- III. Transparency in arms transfers
- IV. The financial value of states’ arms exports
6 World Nuclear Forces
- Overview
- I. Us nuclear forces
- II. Russian nuclear forces
- III. British nuclear forces
- IV. French nuclear forces
- V. Chinese nuclear forces
- VI. Indian nuclear forces
- VII. Pakistani nuclear forces
- VIII. Israeli nuclear forces
- IX. North Korea's military nuclear capabilities
- X. Global stocks and production of fissile materials
- XI. Nuclear explosions, 1945–2013
Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2013
7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
- Overview
- I. Iran and nuclear proliferation concerns
- II. North Korea's nuclear programme
- III. Russian–US cooperation on reducing nuclear risks
- IV. Developments related to multilateral treaties and initiatives on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
8. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
- Overview
- I. Chemical and biological weapon programmes
- II. Chemical weapon arms control and disarmament
- III. Biological weapon arms control and disarmament
- IV. Oversight of dual-purpose research in the life sciences
9. Conventional arms control and military confidence building
- Overview
- I. Humanitarian arms control initiatives
- II. The governance of autonomous weapons
- III. Confidence-building measures for information and communication technologies
- IV. European debates and discussions on conventional arms control
10. Dual-use and arms trade controls
- Overview
- I. The Arms Trade Treaty
- II. Multilateral arms embargoes
- III. Export control regimes
Annexes
Annex A. Arms control and disarmament agreements
- I. Universal treaties
- II. Regional treaties
- III. Bilateral treaties
Annex B. International security cooperation bodies
- I. Bodies with a global focus or membership
- II. Bodies with a regional focus or membership
- III. Strategic trade control regimes
Annex C. Chronology 2013
About the authors
Errata

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SIPRI Yearbook 2014

II. North Korea's nuclear programme

Chapter:: 7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
Source:: SIPRI Yearbook 2014
Author(s):: Shannon N. Kile

On 12 February 2013 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) announced that it had successfully carried out a third underground nuclear test explosion in a tunnel at the Punggye-ri test site in North Hamgyong province in the north-east of the country. The announcement described the test as having ‘diversified’ North Korea's nuclear deterrent by using a smaller and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force than those used in the test explosions conducted in 2006 and 2009.¹ North Korea's claim to have tested a miniaturized nuclear device could not be independently verified.² It was also not possible to determine, based on samples of radioactive gas collected after the test, whether the nuclear device used highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the fissile material or plutonium, which North Korea was believed to have used in the two previous tests.³

Citation (MLA):: Kile, Shannon N.. "7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation." SIPRI Yearbook. SIPRI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. Web. 20 Mar. 2025. <https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-9780198712596-chapter-8-div1-3.xml>.
Citation (APA):: Kile, S. (2016). 7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. In SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 20 Mar. 2025, from https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-9780198712596-chapter-8-div1-3.xml
Citation (Chicago):: Kile, Shannon N.. "7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation." In SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Retrieved 20 Mar. 2025, from https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-9780198712596-chapter-8-div1-3.xml

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