SIPRI Yearbook 2015
IV. Chemical disarmament in conflict areas
In 2014, states and international bodies such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) worked to coordinate efforts under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to monitor and verifiably destroy chemical weapons and associated infrastructure in the major conflict areas of Iraq, Libya and Syria.1 These efforts faced various challenges, which provide context for the policy considerations and operational issues associated with arms control in cases where state and non-state actors from within and outside a region are interacting in contested or ungoverned spaces. An analysis of some of the key monitoring and verification actions, with a particular focus on the largely consensus-based approach adopted by the OPCW in Syria during 2014, provides an indication of what can be achieved in such cases.
- Citation (MLA):
- Hart, John, and Peter Clevestig. "13. Chemical and biological security threats." SIPRI Yearbook. SIPRI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. Web. 19 May. 2025. <https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198737810/sipri-9780198737810-chapter-13-div1-5.xml>.
- Citation (APA):
- Hart, J., & Clevestig, P. (2016). 13. Chemical and biological security threats. In SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 19 May. 2025, from https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198737810/sipri-9780198737810-chapter-13-div1-5.xml
- Citation (Chicago):
- Hart, John, and Peter Clevestig. "13. Chemical and biological security threats." In SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Retrieved 19 May. 2025, from https://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198737810/sipri-9780198737810-chapter-13-div1-5.xml
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